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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly be-
ing adopted for sensing and control functions in a variety of
safety and mission-critical systems such as self-driving cars,
autonomous air vehicles, medical diagnostics and industrial
robotics. Failures of such systems can lead to loss of life or prop-
erty, which necessitates stringent verification and validation for
providing high assurance. Though formal verification approaches
are being investigated, testing remains the primary technique for
assessing the dependability of such systems. Due to the nature
of the tasks handled by DNNs, the cost of obtaining test oracle
data—the expected output, a.k.a. label, for a given input—is high,
which significantly impacts the amount and quality of testing
that can be performed. Thus, prioritizing input data for testing
DNNs in meaningful ways to reduce the cost of labeling can go a
long way in increasing testing efficacy. This paper proposes using
gauges of the DNN’s sentiment derived from the computation
performed by the model, as a means to identify inputs that are
likely to reveal weaknesses. We empirically assessed the efficacy
of three such sentiment measures for prioritization—confidence,
uncertainty and surprise—and compare their effectiveness in
terms of their fault-revealing capability and retraining effective-
ness. The results indicate that sentiment measures can effectively
flag inputs that expose unacceptable DNN behavior. For MNIST
models, the average percentage of inputs correctly flagged ranged
from 88% to 94.8%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNN) are beginning to gain adoption
in safety and mission-critical applications as a means for
realizing higher levels of autonomous operation. However,
this brings with it considerable risk because failures of such
systems can be damaging to life, property or environment.
Recent accidents caused by autonomous vehicles or self-
driving features of automobiles [1] highlight an urgent need
for rigorous yet scalable methods of assuring that DNNs will
function in an acceptable fashion in all circumstances. As with
traditional safety-critical software, one may be able to formally
model and algorithmically verify that essential properties hold
for a DNN. However, formal verification methods are often
hampered by the difficulty of scaling up to larger models.
Thus, as is typical for all software, testing remains the most
practical and readily applicable approach for verifying DNNs.
It is standard practice in the DNN development process to
use testing to to evaluate the learned model. This is typically
done in two phases. The first phase is model validation with
a validation set; this process is tightly integrated with the
training process to tune the hyper-parameters and select the
most appropriate model among the candidates. The second is
the testing phase, executed with a separate test set, which is
independent of the training and validation sets, to evaluate
the trained model at the final stage of development. The
development process is deemed complete only when desired
properties such as adversarial robustness or generalizability to
unseen data are satisfied on the test set.
The second phase of testing, however, can be very expensive
due to the large input space that testing has to cover, and the
cost of labeling those inputs which is needed to determine the
correctness of the outputs produced by a DNN over this input
space. The cost of labeling is typically much higher than that
of collecting test inputs because for many of the tasks that
DNNs are designed to handle, the input data is abundant and
easy to collect, but the oracle cannot be typically automated–
for, if otherwise, there is no need for the DNN in the first place.
Thus, it is prudent to find ways to minimize the labeling effort
for new test inputs.
One way to achieve this is to prioritize those inputs that
are likely to reveal the weakness of a trained model, so that
labeling effort can be focused only on prioritized inputs. We
hypothesize that this priority can be determined by deriving
some additional information about the computation performed
by the DNN—its sentiment—when processing the inputs.
Higher priority inputs are those for which the DNN expresses
a stronger relevant sentiment. In particular, we study three
sentiments—confidence, which is defined as the predicted
probability associated with the output label in DNNs that
use softmax output layers, surprise, which is defined as the
distance of the neuron activation pattern on an input from
the activation patterns on the training data, and uncertainty,
which is defined for Bayesian Neural Networks based on the
the probability distribution of the DNN’s prediction. These
metrics are useful for prioritizing inputs that help us to
more efficiently: (a) address model weakness with reduced
labeling cost, (b) assess model accuracy with a reduced test
suite, and (c) retrain more effectively with fewer, prioritized
inputs. Furthermore, prioritization may also be useful in the
context of run-time monitoring of DNN components as a
means to determine when to trigger system safety or back-up
mechanisms to mitigate potentially erroneous DNN outputs.
We empirically assess how these metrics perform as in-
dicators of the test input’s value using examples of DNNs
for image classification and image regression. Our initial
results show that the measures can prioritize inputs that lead
erroneous DNN outputs, with 74.9% to 94.8% of average
percentage of fault detection (APFD) score, indicating that
sentiment based metrics provide a meaningful basis for prior-
itization.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
03
76
8v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
1 J
an
 20
19
2II. RELATED WORK
Testing of DNNs is attracting consideriable interest from
the research community. For an overview, see [2]. Broadly
speaking, many approaches to test DNNs have focused on
ways to generate test data that expose a weakness such as lack
of robustness [3–6]—for example, generating an adversarial
input that minimally perturbs a known input in a way such
that the expected output does not change, but leads the DNN
to change its output. Generation techniques range from intro-
duction of adversarial perturbations [3, 6, 7] to domain-relevant
transformations [8, 9]. Ideas from software testing such as
statement, branch [3], condition and MC/DC coverage [5] have
been suitably modified and adopted to define various forms of
neuron coverage [10, 11] and show how those metrics can be
used to guide test generation [6, 10, 12]. In these approaches,
the test oracle data (expected output) is determined based,
in general, on a known metamorphic relation between the
reference input and the synthesized input.
While synthesizing test data is indeed quite useful and
effective in identifying faults, it is, in general, not clear how
to systematically identify all these faults or determine the
likelihood of the exposed faulty behavior manifesting when
the system is fielded. Recent work in the area of adversarial
input generation would seem to suggest that DNNs provide a
target-rich environment for attacks.
In the present work, we instead look for ways to rank data
in some form based on their utility for learning the DNN’s
weaknesses, without regard to how this data is obtained.
This is particularly useful if we have a rich input space for
which determining the correct output is tedious. If we aim
for generalizability of the DNN—i.e. performance metrics
obtained during training and validation being truly indicative
of the DNN’s performance when fielded—we need a way to
determine for which inputs generalizability may be adversely
impacted without knowing what the expected output should
be.
Works in the area of active learning studied techniques
for minimizing the cost of labeling in an interactive learning
scheme [13, 14], which we leverage in this paper for test
input prioritization. Especially in a pool-based sampling [15]
scenario, training data is sampled from a large pool of unla-
beled data such that the accuracy of the model can improve
most effectively with the least amount of data. Unlike active
learning where the goal is to find training data that provides
the most information to the model under development, this
work evaluates the prioritization techniques in the context of
testing where the primary goal is to find fault-revealing inputs
efficiently.
III. WHITE-BOX TEST INPUT PRIORITIZATION
The key idea of test input prioritization is to capture infor-
mation available from a DNN that represents sentiments such
as confidence, uncertainty or surprise on an input presented to
the DNN. The relative value of each test input can be judged
based on the model’s sentiment, and higher priority can be
assigned to uncertain or surprising inputs, since those may
more likely reveal erroneous behaviors in the model. Although
the sentiments such as uncertainty usually not provided by a
typical DNN unless explicitly modeled, multiple techniques
exist that captures the sentiments by inspecting the internal
computation of the neural network. This section introduces
three such techniques.
A. Softmax Output as Confidence Prediction
Softmax is a logistic function that squashes a K-
dimensional vector z of real values to a K-dimensional vector
σ(z) of real values where each entry of σ(z) is in the range
[0, 1] and the entries add up to 1: σ(z)j = ezj/
∑K
k=1 e
zk ,
j = 1, ...,K. It is typically used as the last layer of a neural
network for a multi-class classification task so that the output
can represent the categorical probability distribution of the K
classes. When available, the priority score can be computed
directly from the softmax output while incurring a minimal
computational overhead. As an instantiation of the scoring
function, we borrow the notion of entropy to summarize the
distribution and assign a single score to an unseen test input
xi:
score(xi) = −
C∑
c=1
pi,c log pi,c (1)
where C is the number of output classes. Intuitively speaking,
the score is lower for a certain classification where only one
pi,c is high, and higher for an uncertain classification where
the predicted distribution is spread out, thus assigning high
scores to inputs that are more uncertain.
An obvious limitation of softmax-based prioritization is
that it can be applied only to classification models where a
softmax layer is used. However, a more fundamental limitation
is that the predicted probability does not reflect the model’s
confidence, as demonstrated by Gal and Ghahramani [16] and
also shown in the case of adversarial input attacks [17–19].
For instance, an adversarially perturbed input that looks just
like an ostrich to human eyes can be classified as a panda
with 99% confidence. These limitations call for prioritization
techniques that are more reliable and also apply to regression
models.
B. Bayesian Uncertainty
Model uncertainty is the degree to which a model is
uncertain about its prediction for a given input. An uncertain
prediction can be due to a lack of training data—known as
epistemic uncertainty—or due to the inherent noise in the
input data—known as aleatoric uncertainty [20]; but we do
not distinguish the two in this paper because they cannot be
distinguished unless a neural network is explicitly modeled to
predict them as outputs [20]. As it is practically impossible
for a machine-learning model to achieve 100% accuracy,
model uncertainty is immensely useful for engineering a more
robust learning-enabled component. In order to obtain model’s
uncertainty along with the prediction, we need mathematically
grounded techniques based on Bayesian probability theory. We
briefly introduce Bayesian neural network and a technique to
approximate it using existing neural networks. The uncertainty
estimated by these techniques can then be used as scores to
prioritize test inputs.
31) Bayesian Neural Network: A typical (non-Bayesian)
neural network has deterministic parameters that are optimized
to have fixed values. A Bayesian neural network (BNN) [21],
on the other hand, treats parameters as random variables which
can encode distributions. For training, Bayesian inference [22]
is used to update the posterior over the weights W given the
data X and Y: p(W|X,Y) = p(Y|X,W)× p(W)/p(Y|X),
which captures the set of plausible model parameters given
the data. To make the training of the weights tractable, the
weights are often fitted to a simple distribution such as the
Gaussian, and the parameters (mean and variance in the case
of the Gaussian distribution) of the distributions are optimized
during training [23]. The likelihood of the prediction is often
defined as a Gaussian with mean given by the model output:
p(y|fW(x)) = N (fW(x)) where fW(x) denotes random
output of the BNN [20] for an input x and N a normal
distribution.
2) Uncertainty in Bayesian Neural Networks: For a clas-
sification task, the likelihood of predicting an output c for an
input x is defined as:
p(y = c|x,X,Y) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
Softmax(fW(x)) (2)
with T samples. The uncertainty of the probability vector p
is then summarized as the entropy of the probability vector:
H(p) = −∑Cc=1 pc log pc. For regression, the uncertainty is
captured by the predictive variance which is approximated as:
V ar(y) ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=1
fW(x)T fW(x)− E(y)TE(y) (3)
with T samples and the predicted mean E(y) ≈
1
T
∑T
t=1 f
W(x) [20]. In other words, the predictive variance
is obtained by passing the input x T times to the model fW
and by computing the variance among T sampled outputs.
3) Monte-Carlo Dropout as a Bayesian Approximation:
Dropout is a simple regularization technique that prevents
neural network models from over-fitting to training data [24].
It works during the training phase by randomly dropping out
some neurons in specified layers with a given probability, so
that the model parameters are changed only for the sampled
neurons. Since the model parameters are adjusted only by an
infinitesimal amount in each iteration, the cost converges after
sufficient training iterations, even with the variance introduced
by random selection of neurons. At test time, the dropout
is disabled so that every neuron participates in making a
deterministic prediction. This simple technique is shown to
be very effective in improving the performance of neural
networks on supervised learning tasks. It was later discovered
by Gal and Ghahramani [16] that a dropout network can
approximate a Gaussian Process [25]. They proved that an
arbitrary neural network with dropout applied before every
weight layer is mathematically equivalent to an approximation
of a probabilistic Gaussian process. They also showed that any
deep neural network that uses dropout layers can be changed
to produce uncertainty estimations by simply turning on the
dropout at test time (unlike the typical use case where dropout
is turned off), and the likelihood can be approximated with
Monte Carlo integration. The uncertainty of the model can then
be estimated in a same way as in Equation 2 and 3; the only
difference being that the weight W varies by sample t and
follows the dropout distribution such that Ŵt ∼ q∗θ(W) where
qθ(W) is the dropout distribution. We refer more curious
readers to the works by Gal and Ghahraman [16] and Kendall
and Gal [20].
C. Input Surprise
Surprise Adequacy (SA, in short) is a test adequacy criterion
defined by Kim et al. [26] to assess the adequacy of a test suite
for testing deep learning systems. Informally, SA is achieved
when a set of test inputs demonstrates varying degrees of
model’s surprise, measured by the likelihood or distance
function, relative to the training data. The rationale is that a
good test suite shall demonstrate a diverse and representative
behavior of a trained model, and that the surprise can be a
good representation of such diversity in behavior.
Unlike other coverage criteria introduced for testing neural
network so far, such as neuron coverage [3], MC/DC-inspired
criteria [5], or other structural criteria [11], SA is more fine-
grained and unique in that it can assess the quality of each
input individually. For example, SA can measure the relative
surprise of an input to the training data and give it a numeric
score—the higher the score is, the more surprising it is to
the model. Our take of SA is that a surprising input may
more likely reveal an erroneous behavior in the trained model,
since a high surprise may indicate that the model is not well
prepared for the input, and thus should be given a high score.
Kim et al. [26] defined two ways of measuring the surprise.
Both ways make use of the activation trace of a neural network
during a classification. For the classification of every input,
each neuron in the neural network gets activated with a certain
value. The vector of activation values seen when classifying
every input can then be termed as the activation trace of
that input. Given a set of activation traces, AN (T ) for a
known set of inputs T , the surprise of a new input x with
respect to known inputs T can be computed by comparing the
activation trace of the new input α(x) with those from known
inputs AN (T ). Kim et al.proposed two ways of making such
comparisons.
1) A probability density function can be computed for the set
of activation traces for known inputs. For a new input, we
can compute the sum of differences between its estimated
density and densities of known inputs. The higher this
sum, the more surprising the new input is. This method
is termed the Likelihood-based Surprise Adequacy (LSA).
2) Another method for comparing activation traces is to
use a distance function to create another surprise ad-
equacy criterion called Distance-based Surprise Ade-
quacy (DSA). Given the set of known inputs and a new
input x, DSA computation first finds the input xa that is
the closest neighbor of x with the same predicted class as
x respectively. Next, it finds the input, xb, that is closest
to xa, but has a predicted class different from the one
predicted for x. Next dista and distb is computed as:
dista = ||αN (x)− αN (xa)|| (4)
4distb = ||αN (xa)− αN (xb)|| (5)
with xa and xb defined as:
xa = min
D(xi)=cx
||αN (x)− αN (xi)|| (6)
xb = min
D(xi)∈C\{cx}
||αN (xa)− αN (xi)|| (7)
Finally, a value of DSA for the new input x can be
computed as:
DSA(x) =
dista
distb
(8)
LSA is computationally more expensive and requires more
parameter tuning than DSA. One parameter is the small set of
layers that needs to be chosen for LSA. Activation traces for
LSA will then only consist of activation values of neurons in
these selected layers. Another parameter is the value for vari-
ance used to filter out neurons whose activation values were
below a certain threshold. DSA, while still being sensitive to
layer selection, benefits more than LSA from choosing deeper
layers in the network and has fewer parameters that need to be
tuned. For these reasons, we implemented DSA and compared
it with techniques mentioned in the previous two subsections.
IV. EXPERIMENT
We experimentally assessed the efficacy of the input prioriti-
zation techniques in two use-case scenarios. The first use-case
is labeling cost minimization. The second use-case is retraining
the model with the selected fraction of the prioritized inputs
as in active learning, which is a natural next step for utilizing
prioritized inputs. With these scenarios in mind, we propose
the following research questions.
• RQ1. Can we effectively prioritize test inputs that reveal
erroneous behavior in the model?
• RQ2. Can the prioritized inputs be used to retrain the
model effectively?
The efficacy for RQ1 is measured by the cumulative
percentage of error revealing inputs after prioritization. The
efficacy for RQ2 is measured by comparing the accuracy of
the model retrained with prioritized inputs with the baseline
model retrained with randomly-selected inputs.
We answer these research questions for each prioritization
technique and compare their relative performance. As concrete
instantiation of the prioritization techniques, we compare
among the following: 1) softmax, 2) dropout Bayesian with
10 and 100 Monte-Carlo samples, 3) Distance-based Surprise
Adequacy (DSA) measured over the last one layer and last
two layers. For the techniques that require multiple Monte-
Carlo sampling, we compare between 10 and 100 to assess
the trade-off between sample size and prioritization efficacy.
For DSA, we measure the distance of activation traces taken
from the last one layer or last two layers. Although the efficacy
of DSA can be higher when the activation traces were taken
from the middle layers of the neural networks according to
Kim et al. [26], our choice of layers were limited because of
the high space and time complexity of the DSA algorithm.
The time complexity of the DSA algorithm is quadratic to the
length of the hidden-layer output vector, and the hidden layers
deeper than the last two were typically too long to be handled
efficiently given our hardware constraints.
A. Systems Under Test
To simulate a realistic testing scenario where a trained
model is scrutinized with additional test data, we chose two
representative systems for image classification and image
regression. The first system is a digit classification system
trained with the 60,000 MNIST [27] training dataset. We test
the system with the EMNIST [28] dataset, an extension of
MNIST which is compatible to its predecessor. The second
system is called TaxiNet, which is designed for an aircraft
in ground operation to predict the distance to a center line
and the heading angle deviation from a center line while
taxiing. It is designed and developed by our industrial partner
as a research prototype to assess the applicability of learning-
enabled components in the safety-critical domain. The data
collection and training was done by ourselves.
To avoid the high cost of operating an actual aircraft in the
real environment, we collected the dataset in the X-Plane 11
simulation environment wherein the graphics and the dynamics
of the environment and the aircraft are accurately modeled. For
a preliminary assessment, we fixed the runway to KMWH-
04 and the aircraft to be Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, while
varying the position and the angle of the aircraft together with
the weather condition. We used 40,000 samples for training
with some realistic image augmentations—such as brightness,
contrast, blur, vertical affine transformation—turned on in
order to maximize the utility of the training data and create a
more robust model.
B. Model Configuration
The accuracy of a neural network depends on many factors
including the amount and quality of training data, the structure
of the network, and the training process. As the performance
of our proposed prioritization techniques may also depend on
these factors, we treated the structural configuration as an in-
dependent variable. However, since it is infeasible to compare
the effect of all the independent variables to the prioritization
techniques, we configured a number of representative neural
networks with different structures. We controlled the other
hyper-parameters—such as learning rate and mini-batch size—
to be constant across different configurations so that the effect
of the structure alone can be studied. The hyper-parameters
are configured according to the known good practices at the
time of writing this paper so that we can objectively simulate
a realistic testing scenario.
For the digit classification task, we configured four networks
as described in Table I. For all layers except the last one, ReLu
(rectified linear unit) was used as an activation function, and
L2 kernel regularization was applied to prevent the parameters
from over-fitting. During training, we check-pointed the epoch
only when the validation accuracy (with the 10,000 validation
set) improved over the previous epochs, and stopped the
training when the validation accuracy did not improve for more
than twenty consecutive epochs.
5TABLE I: Four digit classification models trained with the MNIST dataset [27] and tested with the EMNIST dataset [28].
Model TrainableParameters Model Structure
Training
Epochs
Validation
Accuracy
EMNIST
Test Accuracy
A 594,922 2 Conv2D - MaxPool - 2 Conv2D - MaxPool - Flatten - Dropout - 2 Dense 82 99.16% 95.74%
B 177,706 2 Conv2D - MaxPool - Flatten - Dropout - 3 Dense 93 98.90% 89.66%
C 728,170 2 Conv2D - MaxPool - Flatten - Dropout - 3 Dense 138 98.81% 86.14%
D 111,514 Dense - Dropout - 3 Dense 102 97.74% 72.90%
For the taxiing task, we compare two different networks
named MobileNet and SimpleNet, supplied by our industry
partner. MobileNet is a convolutional neural network inspired
by MobileNetV2 [29]. The structure of the network is similar
to what is described in Table 2 in Sandler et al.’s paper,
and it is relatively compact in size, with 2,358,642 trainable
parameters. SimpleNet is also a convolutional neural network,
with a simpler structure, but with 4,515,338 trainable param-
eters. It has five sets of convolution, batch normalization, and
activation layers back-to-back, followed by a dropout layer
and four dense layers. Both of the networks implement L2
regularization, and trained with stochastic gradient-descent
algorithm with weight decay.
C. Efficacy Measure
An ideal prioritization technique would consistently assign
high scores to all the error-revealing inputs and low scores
to all the rest. For example, if there were 20 prioritized
test inputs among which 5 were error-revealing, the first
five inputs should all reveal errors and the rest should not.
If we draw a graph of the cumulative sum that represents
the cumulative number of errors revealed by executing each
prioritized input, the graph will be monotonically increasing
until it hits 5, which is the total number of error-revealing
inputs in the given test suite (the orange line in Figure 1). A
test suite without prioritization would produce a line like the
blue line. In practice, the efficacy of a prioritization technique
will be somewhere between random selection and an ideal
prioritization, since it is undecidable to predict whether the
prediction is correct or not, producing a curve that looks like
the green line in Figure 1. The efficacy of a prioritization
technique can then be captured by computing the area under
curve for each technique and computing the ratio of each to the
area under the curve of the idea prioritization criterion. This is
a slight modification to Average Percentage of Fault Detected
(APFD) measure, which is typically used for measuring the
efficacy of test prioritization [30].
D. Implementation and Experiment Environment
We implemented the three prioritization techniques—
softmax, dropout Bayesian, and Surprise Adequacy—in
Python on top of Keras [31], which is one of the most popular
machine-learning libraries. Our tool is thus compatible with
any trained model that abides by Keras’ Model interface.
The surprise adequacy measurement part is implemented in
C++ to better utilize lower-level performance optimizations
and thread-based parallelization. Every feature is integrated
Fig. 1: Cumulative sum of the errors found by test suites
prioritized by each technique (ideal, poor, technique1). The
x-axis corresponds to the test case, where the priority is higher
for the former ones. The y-axis is the total number of errors
found by executing the test cases up to x test cases. The
efficacy score of technique1 is the ratio of its area under curve
to the area under the ideal curve: 83/90 = 92.23.
seamlessly and provided as a Python API. The tool is pub-
licly available on GitHub at http://www.github.com/bntejn/
keras-prioritizer.
The experiments are performed on Ubuntu 16.04 running
on an Intel i5 CPU, 32GB DDR3 RAM, an SSD, and a single
NVIDIA GTX 1080-Ti GPU.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We ran our prioritization tool on the test datasets for all the
trained models of MNIST and TaxiNet and measured the pri-
oritization effectiveness in terms of misbehavior identification
and retraining improvement.
A. RQ1: Effectiveness of prioritization in identifying erro-
neous behavior
The effectiveness of prioritization in identifying misbehav-
ior is illustrated in Figure 2 and summarized in Table II. For
each model we present the validation accuracy, test accuracy,
and the score of prioritization in Average Percentage of Faults
Detected (APFD) as described in Section IV-C. The accuracy
of classification is presented as the percentage of correct
classification, and the accuracy of regression is presented
as mean absolute error (MAE). The MAE for TaxiNet is
defined as 1nΣ
n
i=1|fW(x)i − yi| where n—the length of the
output vector—is two for TaxiNet. The output of TaxiNet is
normalized to be between −1 and 1, so the MAE is always
between 0.0 and 1.0 where a lower error is more desirable.
We also present the accuracy as a percentage; the correctness
6(a) MNIST-A (b) MNIST-B (c) MNIST-C
(d) MNIST-D (e) TaxiNet-MobileNet (f) TaxiNet-SimpleNet
Fig. 2: The cumulative sum of the error revealing inputs by test inputs of decreasing priority: The x-axis represents the test cases
sorted in a decreasing order of priority. The y-axis shows the cumulative sum of error-revealing inputs. An ideal prioritization
should sort every error-revealing inputs to the front, drawing a highly convex curve. A poor prioritization, on the other hand,
will produce a curve with lower convexity.
TABLE II: The efficacy of test input prioritization in misbehavior identification
Dataset Architecture Validation Accuracy Test Accuracy
Sentiment Measures
Softmax Dropout Surprise (DSA)
10 100 last1 last2
MNIST
A (CNN + Batch norm) 99.16% 95.74% 94.80 93.20 93.57 94.26 92.80
B (CNN) 98.90% 89.66% 91.10 90.87 91.21 90.99 87.06
C (CNN) 98.81% 86.14% 89.30 89.09 89.35 88.98 89.26
D (fully-connected) 97.74% 72.90% 87.90 87.58 88.02 88.13 87.77
TaxiNet MobileNet 0.0394 (99.90%) 0.0764 (97.73%) 82.84 86.16SimpleNet 0.0575 (99.66%) 0.1243 (90.53%) 74.91 77.56
(a) High priority input (b) Low priority input
Fig. 3: Representative inputs of high vs. low priority:
high utility score was assigned to inputs that produce high
uncertainty—in this case, due to the lack of visible center line
in the runway image taken around an intersection.
of an output is determined by a fixed error threshold on MAE
of 0.25.
The efficacy of prioritization presented as APFD scores
ranged from 74.91 to 94.80 over the different models, which
suggests that test input prioritization works in highlighting
error-revealing inputs, regardless of the type of task and the
structure of the network. Among different techniques, the
efficacy of softmax, dropout Bayesian, and DSA were all
similar for the same model, but the efficacy of the dropout
Bayesian method was higher with more samples as larger
samples can be used to more accurately depict the posterior
distribution.
An interesting observation is that the efficacy of the prior-
itization metrics is correlated with the test accuracy of the
model, or more precisely, the difference of the validation
accuracy and the test accuracy of the model. The APFD
was consistently high for the well-performing models and
consistently low for the worse-performing models, regardless
of the choice of sentiment measure. One plausible cause for
7TABLE III: The efficacy of input prioritization in retraining
Dataset Architecture Validation AccuracyBaseline
Test Accuracy
Baseline
Sentiment Measures
Softmax Dropout Surprise (DSA)
10 100 last 1 last 2
MNIST
A 99.23% 97.48% 97.95% 98.09 % 98.06 % 98.18% 98.44%
B 98.90% 95.66% 96.78% 97.41% 96.26% 97.35% 96.48%
C 98.70% 95.02% 94.65% 95.70% 94.50% 95.02% 94.45%
D 97.80% 90.57% 89.93% 87.58% 88.26% 91.87% 92.00%
TaxiNet MobileNet 0.0336 (100.00%) 0.0364 (99.86%) 99.84% 99.89%Simple 0.0502 (99.85%) 0.0522 (99.05%) 99.71% 99.56%
this phenomenon is covariate shift [32], which is a situation
when the distribution of the input data shifts from training
dataset to test dataset. A stark decrease in the test accuracy for
some models suggests that the distribution of the data shifted
from the training data to test data, and some models (such as
A and B) are relatively robust to the shift while the others are
not. Model A, for instance, implements batch normalization,
a technique known to reduce the internal covariate shift [33]
and was more robust to the covariate shift in input distribution,
which contributed to a higher prioritization effectiveness. In
conclusion to our first research question:
Prioritized inputs can effectively identify erroneous
behavior in a trained model. The prioritization is more
effective when the model has higher test accuracy.
B. RQ2: Effectiveness of prioritization in retraining
We assess the utility of the prioritized inputs when a model
is retrained with the training dataset augmented with the
prioritized inputs. This evaluation is similar to the active
learning scenario but different in that the model under test
is already well-trained. We only sample 1% of the amount
of training data from the test set, which equals to 600 for
the MNIST models and 400 for the TaxiNet models. The
baseline approach we compare against is random selection
with the same sample size—we hypothesize that prioritization
techniques perform better than the random selection. Hyper-
parameters other than the augmented training data were kept
constant in retraining runs.
Table III shows that the relative efficacy of retraining fol-
lows a similar trend to the error-revealing efficacy presented in
Table II. The prioritized inputs could improve the accuracy of
the retrained models more effectively than randomly sampled
inputs in most cases, and the efficacy was more pronounced for
MNIST model A and B than in model C and D. When model
B and C are compared, model B consistently performed better
when retrained with prioritized inputs while model C almost
always performed worse when retrained with with randomly
sampled inputs. One hypothetical explanation could be that
a well-architectured DNN model with a better generalization
benefits more from learning the corner-cases, whereas an
unoptimal DNN learns more from general cases. However,
the exact reason for this phenomenon cannot be drawn from
the limited experiment—a future investigation is necessary. In
conclusion to the second research question:
Sentiment measures can prioritize inputs that can aug-
ment the training dataset with which a better accuracy
can be achieved. But random sampling was found more
effective for the models that achieve low test accuracy.
C. Threats to Validity
In the experiment, we evaluated the sentiment measures with
both an image classification task and an image regression task,
and configured several DNNs with various structural features.
Despite our effort, the representativeness of the configured
DNNs were inevitably limited in number and variety, and
our empirical findings might not generalize to other types of
DNNs such as recurrent neural nets. Nevertheless, the DNNs
we evaluated are of realistic sizes and implement some of the
most widely used techniques that are applied in practical deep
learning practices [34].
The second experiment for answering RQ2 was performed
without the statistical rigor required for hypothesis testing due
to the prohibitive cost of retraining a large model multiple
times. We present the result and the finding as a preliminary
assessment of the sentiment measures in the context of testing
which calls for more rigorous empirical assessment in future
work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented techniques for mitigating the oracle
problem in testing DNNs by prioritizing error-revealing in-
puts based on white-box measures of DNN’s sentiment—
softmax confidence, Bayesian uncertainty, and input surprise.
We evaluated the three techniques on two example systems
for image classification and image regression, and multiple
versions of the DNNs configured with different architectures.
The experiment showed that the sentiment measures can
prioritize error-revealing inputs with an average fault-detection
rate of 74.9 to 94.8, indicating that input prioritization based
on sentiment measures is a viable approach for effectively
identifying weakness of trained models with reduced labeling
cost.
We firmly believe that more attention should be paid to tech-
niques that can facilitate field testing of safety-critical DNNs,
which can be a laborious process and that test prioritization is
an important step towards that goal, providing practical utility
and good scalability. Further research is still warranted for
assessing the representativeness and completeness of test sets
8with respect to the operational environments of DNN-based
systems.
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